

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

TRISTAN FLORENDO-ONG,)	
)	
<i>Plaintiff,</i>)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 22-1596 (UNA)
)	
IL-USA <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
<i>Defendants.</i>)	

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tristan Florendo-Ong, appearing *pro se*, has filed a largely incomprehensible Complaint, Dkt. 1, and a Motion for Leave to Proceed *in forma pauperis*, Dkt. 2. The Court will grant the Motion and dismiss the case.

Florendo-Ong resides in Chicago, Illinois. He has named a long list of defendants, *see* Compl. at 2–6, and appears to seek review of his criminal convictions in Illinois courts, *see id.* at 8–9. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.” *Gray v. Poole*, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); *Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923)); *see United States v. Choi*, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (federal district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”). Plaintiff’s recourse lies, if at all, in the Illinois courts and ultimately in the U.S. Supreme Court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1257; *Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals*, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Section 1257 “channels directly to the Supreme Court all federal review of judicial decisions of state . . . courts of last resort”).

Mr. Florendo-Ong also mentions the Civil Rights statutes, *see* Compl. at 1, 8, but he makes no cogent, supporting factual allegations and “federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if,” as here, “they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit [or] wholly insubstantial[.]” *Hagans v. Lavine*, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (cleaned up). In addition, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Here, because Florendo-Ong’s complaint lacks any discrete claim against any named defendant, it does not satisfy that standard. Consequently, this case will be dismissed by separate order.

/s/

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge

Date: July 1, 2022