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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia

JORGE LUIS ORTIZ-ESQUIVEL,)
Plaintiff,)
v.) Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00419 (UNA)
SECRETARY OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,)))
Defendant.)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* and his *pro se* complaint for a writ of mandamus to expedite his removal proceedings.

The extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is available to compel an "officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. A plaintiff bears a heavy burden of showing that his right to a writ of mandamus is "clear and indisputable." *In re Cheney*, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "It is well-settled that a writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts." *Cox v. Sec'y of Labor*, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). "[M]andamus is 'drastic'; it is available only in 'extraordinary situations." *Cheney*, 406 F.3d at 729 (citations omitted). Only if "(1) a plaintiff has a clear right to relief, (2) a defendant has a clear duty to act, and (3) there is no

other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff," *Thomas v. Holder*, 750 F.3d 899, 903 (D.C. Cir.

2014), is mandamus relief granted.

Plaintiff addresses none of these elements, and thus fails to meet his burden. Furthermore,

"[i]t is well-settled that a writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts," Cox v.

Sec'y of Labor, 739 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases), and plaintiff does not

demonstrate that this defendant owes him any duty or that the purported duty in expediting his

removal proceedings is mandatory rather than discretionary. See Thye v. United States, 109 F.3d

127, 128–29 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that there exists no private right of action that would allow

a party to compel prisoner's release for immediate deportation); see also Perez v. Immigration &

Naturalization Service, 979 F.2d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoner cannot compel

deportation by mandamus or any other means, prior to completion of custodial sentence) (citation

omitted); Cordova v. Bryson, No: 5:16-CV-0544, 2017 WL 902869 at *2-*3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 7,

2017) (holding that deferral of a prisoner's deportation until the completion of his term of

incarceration does not violate the laws of the United States) (citations omitted); Josephs v. Christie,

No. 10-1071, 2010 WL 3522080 at *3-*4 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2010) (collecting cases and holding

that prisoner had no private right of action, as a convicted alien, to seek his early removal before

serving his complete sentence of imprisonment); 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1231(a)(4) (describing discretion

of the Attorney General in implementing removal proceedings).

The Court will grant plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [2] and

dismiss the complaint [1] and this matter without prejudice. Plaintiff's motions for appointment

of counsel [4] and for fast-track designation [5] are denied as moot. An Order accompanies this

Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: March 2019

Inited States District Judge