

While the court recognizes that complaints filed by *pro se* litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), even *pro se* litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Jarrell v. Tisch*, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that complaints contain, *inter alia*, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (holding that the complaint must contain enough “factual matter” to suggest liability) (citation and alterations omitted).

Zhou’s Complaint fails to meet the Rule 8(a) standard. Most of her thirty-five page Complaint involves alleged misconduct by judicial officials, public servants and medical professionals involved in her custody litigation. None of those individuals are named Defendants in this lawsuit. The few allegations she makes involving the Defendants in this case are undecipherable, and/or she fails to set forth any viable legal theory to support her allegations. Specifically, Zhou alleges that: (1) her daughter was “kidnapped by illegal means of being bribed government officials, such as, Mark R. Herring”; (2) she was unable to obtain a police report because of Herring; and (3) Herring harbored criminals. (Compl. pp. 1, 3). Zhou further alleges that all Defendants provided aid to the alleged kidnappers of her daughter, including the daughter’s father, in exchange for monetary bribes, and engaged in unexplained misconduct that

17-cv-616-TSC. After the court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be transferred to Virginia for lack of venue, the case was dismissed on Zhou’s motion.

led to dismissals of her prior lawsuits. (*Id.* pp. 6-8). These allegations are not sufficient to “give the defendant[s] fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555–56. As such, dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Rule 8(a).

Additionally, Zhou’s claims do not appear to have any connection to the District of Columbia. The general federal venue statute provides that a civil action may be brought in

- (1) “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located”;
- (2) “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated”; or
- (3) “if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). None of these criteria are met in this case because all of the allegedly illegal conduct appears to have occurred in Virginia.

In cases filed in the wrong venue, the district court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Because the basis of Zhou’s claims is unclear, the court will exercise its discretion to dismiss this action, rather than transfer it to Virginia.

The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to:

HUIXUAN ZHOU
7215 Pine Drive
Annandale, VA 22003

Date: October 23, 2017

Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge