	IITED STATES DISTRICT COU R THE DISTRICT OF COLUME	
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Joel Jockton Beavers	)	Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts
Plaintiff,	)	
v.	) Civil Action	No. 11 30:17
Henderson Hill et al.,	)	
Defendants.	)	
	,	

## MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiff's *pro se* complaint and application for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. The Court will grant the *in forma pauperis* application and dismiss the case because the complaint fails to meet the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Jarrell v. Tisch*, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); *see Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009); *Ciralsky v. CIA*, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of *res judicata* applies. *Brown v. Califano*, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).



Plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident, sues two attorneys for at least the third time in this Court. *See Beavers v. Watters*, No. 10-1120 (D.D.C. June 30, 2010), Mem. Op. at 1 (noting, in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that plaintiff's previous complaint was dismissed for the same reason). Plaintiff alleges only that "[t]his case was found to be untrue and was overturned the full sentence was served," and he seeks \$9.9 million in damages. Compl. at 1. Plaintiff has not stated a basis for federal court jurisdiction and the sparse allegations provide no notice of a claim. In fact, the allegations "constitute the sort of patently insubstantial claims" that deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. *Tooley v. Napolitano*, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009); *see Caldwell v. Kagan*, 777 F. Supp.2d 177, 178 (D.D.C. 2011) ("A district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction when the complaint 'is patently insubstantial, presenting no federal question suitable for decision.'") (*quoting Tooley*, 586 F.3d at 1009). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

United States District Judge