

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

**FILED**

**MAY 19 2010**

Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy  
Courts for the District of Columbia

**Jason Earl Jones,**

**Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**Walt Karpinski et al.,**

**Defendants.**

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**Civil Action No.: 10-560 (UNA)**

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

The plaintiff has now filed the required financial information in support of his application to proceed without prepayment of fees and his pro se complaint, which contains a request for a preliminary injunction. The application will be granted, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous, and the request for a preliminary injunction will be denied as moot.

Plaintiff Jason Earl Jones is an inmate in the Kern Valley State Prison in California. He brings a civil RICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations] claim, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, against the United States, the United States Secret Service, the State of California, California's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Los Angeles County and its District Attorney, and Walt Karpinski, an alleged agent for some of the California defendants. Jones alleges that


on or about the date of June 27, 2007, after an admission of engaging in multiple acts of racketeering activity and defrauding the plaintiffs' [sic] out of property, defendant Walt Karpinski, acting on behalf of defendants Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and the State of California, ratified an agreement under the provisions of California's domestic common law . . . wherein the defendants agreed to negotiate the instrument (warrant # PA032579) to the plaintiffs' [sic] and discharge/release to the plaintiffs' [sic] the property previously seized by the defendants. This property included the natural man, Jason Earl Jones.

Complaint at 7-8. The complaint contains additional equally frivolous and contrived allegations. *See id.* at 9 (alleging a breach of “private security agreement/promissory not #PAO32579).

This complaint rests on “factual contentions [that] are clearly baseless” and that “describ[e] fantastic or delusional scenarios.” *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989) (determining that courts have the “unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless”). As such, the complaint warrants dismissal as frivolous.

Accordingly, this complaint will be dismissed as frivolous,<sup>1</sup> and the request for a preliminary injunction will be denied as moot. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 23, 2010

  
United States District Judge

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<sup>1</sup> This determination constitutes a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).