

**FILED**

**MAR 23 2009**

**NANCY MAYER WHITTINGTON, CLERK  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

RAYMOND QUIGLEY,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN RONNIE HOLT,

Respondent.

Civil Action No. **09 0543**

**MEMORANDUM OPINION**

This matter comes before the Court on petitioner's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* and *pro se* petition for a writ of habeas corpus.


Petitioner states that he was sentenced in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to an aggregate term of 70 years' imprisonment. Pet. at 2. It appears that petitioner challenges certain evidence presented to the grand jury and at trial, *see id.* at 5-6, and alleges that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. *See id.* at 7. Challenges of this nature must be brought by motion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-110. In relevant part D.C. Code § 23-110 provides:

[An] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

D.C. Code § 23-110(g). "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas corpus." *Saleh v. Braxton*, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992). It is

settled that “a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless the local remedy is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” *Byrd v. Henderson*, 119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); *Garris v. Lindsay*, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 993 (1986). A prisoner’s lack of success in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence by means of a motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective. *See Wilson v. Office of the Chairperson*, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995).

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this date.

  
United States District Judge

Date: March 9, 2009